Weekly Column - Monday, October 1, 2001
"Russian Mafia Tied to bin Laden Group"
by J. R. Nyquist
The Washington Times published a story on Sept. 26 with the headline, "Bin Laden terror group tries to acquire chemical arms." Written by Bill Gertz, the opening paragraph states: "U.S. intelligence agencies have uncovered new information that Osama bin Laden and his terrorist group, al Qaeda, are acquiring from the Russian mafia components for weapons of mass destruction."
The importance of a relationship between bin Laden and Russian organized crime cannot be overrated. In 1990, intelligence researcher Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. wrote a book with the title "Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America." According to Douglass, Russian organized crime is a Kremlin creation. After all, how could criminals set up anything under a police state where surveillance is total?
In the author's preface, Douglass wrote: "My concern over the origins of drug trafficking dates back to 1984, when I read an article that described the linkages between the trafficking and revolutionary terrorists in Latin America."
Douglass was fascinated to read that four high-level Cuban officials were indicted for drug trafficking by a Miami grand jury in November 1982. Apparently the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba mixed terrorism with drug trafficking. But Cuba was not the only Communist country involved in organized crime.
"As I delved more deeply into the subject," wrote Douglass, "it became apparent that Cuba was not an isolated example. There was also extensive data linking the People's Republic of China to international drug trafficking. Additionally, there was evidence that Nicaragua, Bulgaria, East Germany and North Korea were also involved in trafficking as a matter of official state policy."
At the time, these nations were part of the Soviet Bloc. Douglass wanted to know why so many of Moscow's satellites were involved in drug trafficking. Could such a thing be possible without the Kremlin's connivance?
In 1985 Douglass had lunch with defector Jan Sejna, a former secretary in the Czech Central Committee who worked directly under Russia's top grand strategists. Douglass states in his book that, "General Sejna remains, to my knowledge, the highest positioned Soviet Bloc defector ever to seek political asylum in the West, and the only such official who actually was a member of the decision-making hierarchy."
Douglass asked Sejna about Soviet Bloc drug trafficking. "For the next hour or two," writes Douglass, "he provided extensive details on Soviet narcotics trafficking operations, including their use of satellite countries, the dates of the key decisions, and most importantly, the basic Soviet strategy."
Why is this significant today?
In David Remnick's Pulitzer Prize winning book, "Lenin's Tomb," we find a chilling passage which indicates the equivocal situation in the East. In describing the collapse of the Soviet Union, Remnick notes: "Russia has bred a world-class mafia. According to Luciano Violante, chairman of Italy's Parliamentary committee of inquiry into the mafia, Russia is now 'a kind of strategic capital of organized crime from where all the major operations are launched.' He said that Russian mob leaders have held summits with the three main Italian crime organizations from Sicily, Calabria and Naples to discuss drug-money laundering, narcotics trade, and even the sale of nuclear material."
Here we see a link between organized crime and terrorism. In fact, it is a link between drug trafficking and weapons of mass destruction. Why should these two things be linked? And if the Russians have succeeded in dominating organized crime across the planet, what are the strategic implications?
As stated by Jan Sejna, the final step in the Kremlin narcotic's strategy was "to plan and prepare for sabotage throughout the whole world." Given this, was not Sept. 11 the most stupendous act of sabotage ever attempted? And is it so strange, given the clandestine continuance of Russian enmity, that the Washington Times should report a connection between Russian drug traffickers and Osama bin laden?
According to Washington Times reporter Bill Gertz, U.S. intelligence has detected linkages between the Russian mob's opium business and the Taliban. Russian crime groups acquire opium from Afghanistan which they refine into heroin and sell to the West. A former State Department official, Larry Johnson, told the Washington Times that a connection between bin Laden and the Russian mob is not surprising. "There has been evidence in the past of links between the Taliban militia and the Russian mob on opium," said Johnson to the Times.
As Douglass' research and Sejna's testimony confirms, the Russian mob is not an ordinary drug trafficking operation. It is a Kremlin sponsored strategic instrument, organized by the Russian security services to facilitate terrorism and subversion against the United States and its allies.
According to Sejna, in 1956 Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev ordered a special study on the use of narcotics trafficking against the West. The effects of narcotics on several generations of Americans was analyzed by the Soviet Academy of Sciences.
"The conclusions of the study," wrote Douglass, "were that trafficking would be extremely effective, that the most vulnerable targets were the United States, Canada, France, and West Germany, and that the Soviets should capitalize on the opportunity."
The Kremlin strategy envisioned the creation of Kremlin-controlled organized crime groups, and called for the infiltration of existing mafias worldwide. According to Douglass, "The Soviets reasoned that if they could successfully infiltrate organized crime, they would have unusually good possibilities to control many politicians and would have access to the best information on drugs, money, weapons, and corruption of many kinds. A secondary reason was to use organized crime as a covert mechanism for distributing drugs."
According to Col. Stanislav Lunev, the highest ranking defector from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff, Russia's 1992 war plan involved the smuggling of tactical nuclear weapons into the U.S. using routes successfully established by drug traffickers. In this context, Russian official statements about "missing nuclear suitcase bombs" should not be taken at face value.
It has long been suspected that Osama bin Laden launders drug money from the Afghan opium trade. Now we have positive testimony, related by the Washington Times, indicating that bin Laden is directly involved with Russian mobsters. It is in this context that we should consider the statement of Lithuanian Vice President Algirdas Katkus, who said, "Westerners believe that the Mafia is the product of post-communism ... in reality it is organized, staffed and controlled by the KGB."
It is high time that American understood the kind of criminal network we are dealing with. The links between international narcotics trafficking and terrorism need to be emphasized with greater clarity, along with the Kremlin's involvement.
© Jeffrey R. Nyquist, October 1, 2001
30. 8. 2001 17:53:32
Vím, že sovětský velvyslanec a následně Gorbačov požadovali po premiéru Adamcovi, aby zařídil volbu Václava Havla presidentem. Stačí Vám tento detail k pochopení?
23. 8. 2001 11:15:54
Domníváte se, že působí v dnešním veřejném a politickém životě bývalí agenti KGB?
30. 8. 2001 14:12:22
Myslím, že ano, a nejen agenti KGB.
(ÚRYVEK Z ROZHOVORU S BÝVALÝM VĚDECKÝM PRACOVNÍKEM PROGNOSTICKÉHO ÚSTAVU, ŘÍZENÉHO TEHDY VALTREM KOMÁRKEM A MÍSTOPŘEDSEDOU KOMUNISTICKÉ STRANY ČECH A MORAVY, MILOSLAVEM RANSDORFEM:)
Špionážna story menom Mitrochin
Európa hľadá agentov KGB
Taký úlovok sa vyskytne v spravodajskej brandži raz za storočie. Stalo sa začiatkom 90. rokov. Na veľvyslanectvo USA v Lotyšsku prišiel ponúknuť svoje služby postarší Rus a sľuboval významné dokumenty z archívov sovietskej tajnej služby - KGB. Po rozpade Sovietskeho zväzu bolo podobných obchodníkov so štátnym tajomstvom veľa. Americká CIA zaváhala a prišla o ,,sólokapra‘‘, pretože tým mužom bol bývalý plukovník KGB, pracovník jej archívu, známy dnes pod menom Vasilij Mitrochin. Odmietnutý Mitrochin podišiel k susednej ambasáde - britskej. Britská tajná služba získala vraj vyše 80-tisíc dokumentov, ktoré sa neznámym spôsobom podarilo Mitrochinovi vyniesť z archívu KGB. Dodnes oficiálni predstavitelia Ruskej federácie popierajú, že by ktosi s týmto menom a hodnosťou v KGB pracoval. To je bežný postup všetkých spravodajských služieb, ktorým odhalia agenta. Mitrochin v spolupráci s historikom Christopherom Andrewom vydal 11. októbra 645-stránkovú knihu Mitrochinove archívy . Mediálnu bombu kúpili londýnske The Times a uverejňujú ju na pokračovanie.
AKO IDENTIFIKOVAŤ AGENTOV KGB
Obsahuje dokumenty o agentoch KGB v jednotlivých západných krajinách, uvádza ich pod ich krycími menami, ale sú sprevádzané znakmi, podľa ktorých je možné ich identifikovať. Od roku 1996 išli z Londýna informácie jednotlivým západným krajinám o odhalenej sieti. Postupne vznikali a rozvíjali sa politické škandály, kompromitovaní politici zverejňovali svoje dementi. Začalo sa to Veľkou Britániou, cez Francúzsko a Nemecko a skončilo sa to nedávno v Taliansku.
Taliansky opozičný predák Silvio Berlusconi inicioval vznik parlamentnej vyšetrovacej komisie, ktorá mala označiť vinníkov. Bývalý minister obrany Beniamimo Andreatta obvinil Romana Prodiho, že vo funkcii predsedu talianskej vlády nezasiahol, hoci od roku 1996 prichádzali z Londýna príslušné informácie. Terajší predseda Európskej komisie obvinenie odmietol a tvrdí, že žiadne, ani priame, ani nepriame informácie o Mitrochinovom zozname pre Taliansko nedostal. Bývalý šéf talianskych tajných služieb (Sismi) generál Sergio Siracusa sa bránil tým, že boli vážne pochybnosti o hodnovernosti Mitrochinovho zoznamu. Konkrétny zoznam však prišiel do Ríma až v marci tohto roka, keď bol predsedom vlády už Massimo D’Alema. Prípad vyvolal prirodzenú vlnu útokov proti komunistom, napríklad proti Armandovi Cossuttovi, tajomníkovi Strany talianskych komunistov, ktorá má v terajšej vláde dvoch ministrov. A. Cossutta sa bránil tým, že preňho ako komunistického politika, ktorý sa stretával s Brežnevom, Gromykom, Andropovom a Gorbačovom, by bolo smiešne informovať aj KGB. Podľa známej praxe komunistických tajných služieb, platnej aj u nás, aj v iných krajinách, komunistických funkcionárov získavať nemuseli, hľadali svojich informátorov v iných stranách a v štátnom aparáte, medzi novinármi a diplomatmi.
KARDINAL NAĚALEJ PRACUJE?
Mitrochin uvádza aj veľa spojení KGB v Nemeckej spolkovej republike, väčšinou sú to už známe kauzy. Nové sú iba údaje o agentovi KGB v centrále teraz vládnucej SPD, ktorý doteraz pôsobí pod kódovým označením Kardinal, a ešte počas Brandtovej návštevy v Moskve v r. 1973 poslal vopred zoznam a charakteristiky jeho sprievodu a zoznam tém pripravených na rokovania. Z dokumentov napríklad vyplýva, že KGB sa v r. 1981 neúspešne pokúsila nasadiť svojho človeka na vtedajšieho primátora Saarbrückenu Oskara Lafontaina.
Za hlavné pôsobisko agentov KGB v rokoch studenej vojny pokladá Mitrochin Paríž, kde vraj pôsobilo okolo 50 agentov, viac ako kdekoľvek v Európe. Ich vplyvu pripisuje Mitrochin to, že cez dvoch socialistických politikov prvej dôležitosti sa KGB podarilo zohrať hlavnú úlohu pri vtedajšom ústupe Francúzska z NATO v r. 1966. Vo Francúzsku, rovnako ako v iných západných krajinách, sa KGB orientovala na významných novinárov. Uvádzajú sa krycie mená z Le Monde , Agence France Presse a Expresse , v Taliansku z La Repubblica , L’Expresso , Corriere della Sera .
Vo Veľkej Británii sa najčastejšie uvádza meno bývalého dôstojníka Scotland Yardu Johna Symondsa, známeho ako ,,agent-Romeo‘‘ s príslušnou systemizáciou prvého milovníka, ktorého v tejto profesii osobitne cvičili v Moskve, a meno Melity Norwoodovej, vedenej pod heslom ,,Hola‘‘, starej, 87-ročnej agentky KGB ,,z presvedčenia‘‘.
Podobne ako v Taliansku a v iných krajinách majú pozorovatelia pochybnosti, do akej miery je ,,Mitrochinov zoznam‘‘ vierohodný. V skutočnosti to nie je zoznam, je to súhrn rôznych dokumentov, v ktorých sú uvádzané mená v rôznych súvislostiach. Jednak sú to priami agenti, jednak oficiálne kontakty, o ktorých sa referuje, a napokon osoby, o ktoré KGB prejavovala záujem. A pri tejto tretej kategóri sa málokedy uvádza údaj, či tento záujem bol obojstranný. Skúsenosti so zoznamami ŠTB nás poučili, koľko bolo takých ,,agentov‘‘, ktorí o svojom zázname ani nevedeli, koľkokrát to bolo zbožné želanie ,,riadiaceho dôstojníka‘‘. Nemožno vylúčiť ani spravodajské hry, ktoré majú svoju rovnako dlhú tradíciu ako samy špionážne služby.
Zdroj Národná obroda, Slovensko
Kniha: The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB
by Christopher Andrew, Vasill Mitrohhin, Vasili Mitrokhin
In early 1992, a Russian man walked into the British embassy in a newly independent Baltic republic and asked to "speak to someone in authority." As he sipped his first cup of proper English tea, he handed over a small file of notes. Eight months later, the man, his family, and his enormous archive had been safely exfiltrated to Britain. When news that a KGB officer had defected with the names of hundreds of undercover agents leaked out in 1996, a spokesperson for the SVR (Russia's foreign intelligence service, heir of the KGB) said, "Hundreds of people! That just doesn't happen! Any defector could get the name of one, two, perhaps three agents--but not hundreds!"
Vasili Nikitich Mitrokhin worked as chief archivist for the FCD, the foreign-intelligence arm of the KGB. Mitrokhin was responsible for checking and sealing approximately 300,000 files, allowing him unrestricted access to one of the world's most closely guarded archives. He had lost faith in the Soviet system over the years, and was especially disturbed by the KGB's systematic silencing of dissidents at home and abroad. Faced with tough choices--stay silent, resign, or undermine the system from within--Mitrokhin decided to compile a record of the foreign operations of the KGB. Every day for 12 years, he smuggled notes out of the archive. He started by hiding scraps of paper covered with miniscule handwriting in his shoes, but later wrote notes on ordinary office paper, which he took home in his pockets. He hid the notes under his mattress, and on weekends took them to his dacha, where he typed them and hid them in containers buried under the floor. When he escaped to Britain, his archive contained tens of thousands of pages of notes.
In 1995, Mitrokhin, by then a British citizen, contacted Christopher Andrew (For the President's Eyes Only), head of the faculty of history at Cambridge University and one of the world's foremost historians of international intelligence. Andrew was allowed to examine the archive Mitrokhin created "to ensure that the truth was not forgotten, that posterity might some day come to know of it." The Sword and the Shield is the earthshaking result. The book details the KGB's foreign-intelligence operations, most notably those aimed at Great Britain and the "Main Adversary"--the United States. In the 700-page book, Andrew reveals operations aimed at discrediting high-profile Americans, from Martin Luther King to Ronald Reagan; secret arms caches still hidden--and boobytrapped--throughout the West; disinformation efforts, including forging a letter from Lee Harvey Oswald in an attempt to implicate the CIA in the assassination of JFK; attempts to stir up racial tensions in the U.S. by sending hate mail and even bombs; and the existence of deep-cover agents in North America and Europe--some of whom were effectively "outed" when the book was published.
Mitrokhin's detailed notes are well served by Andrew, who writes forcefully and clearly. The Sword and the Shield represents a remarkable intelligence coup--one that will have serious repercussions for years to come. As Andrew notes, "No one who spied for the Soviet Union at any period between the October Revolution and the eve of the Gorbachev era can now be confident that his or her secrets are still secure." --Sunny Delaney --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
The New York Times Book Review, Joseph E. Persico
...a sweeping, densely documented history of the K.G.B. and its predecessor incarnations.... The overall impact of this volume is convincing, though none of the material will send historians scurrying to rewrite their books. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
Copyright © MM Intelligence Forum
The Mitrokhin Archive: the KGB in Europe and the West
By Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin
London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1999
Reviewed by Reg Whitaker For Intelligence Forum
Few books on espionage have made such a media and commercial splash as The Mitrokhin Archive. Perhaps only the late Peter Wright's Spycatcher has ever matched it, but Wright's success was driven by the British government's frantic but incompetent attempts to ban his memoir. In this case, The Mitrokhin Archive arrives from a cache under a Russian dacha floor, courtesy of the British intelligence community itself, and its chosen historian, Chris Andrew. The provenance of this archive is itself a matter of some controversy. But why the fuss? And does it live up to its advance billing?
The question of how the Mitrokhin 'archive' actually came into existence is itself mysterious. Andrew paints Mitrokhin as a secret dissident, sent home from a foreign posting with a black mark on his record, who nevertheless was put in charge of transferring the entire files of the foreign intelligence section to its new headquarters. In this job, he spent years laboriously copying out important documents by hand and then retyping them in his dacha, where he hid them under the floor (eventually six fat suitcases full). There are a number of seeming improbabilities in this scenario. As Amy Knight sarcastically asked in a critical review in the Times Literary Supplement (Nov. 26 1999): "Did not the KGB have some sort of time-accounting or performance reports as all bureaucracies do? The sheer volume of the materials Mitrokhin is said to have copied by hand (tens of thousands of documents) makes one wonder how he could have found the time." Also mysterious is why this 'dissident' kept hold of the files for years, then how he managed to smuggle them out to a Baltic country following the collapse of the USSR right under the watchful eyes of the KGB's successors. The final mystery is how Christopher Andrew was put in exclusive charge of this archive (presumably translated into English for his benefit) and ready for a marketing exclusive with the Rupert Murdoch press empire. These are all interesting and difficult questions, but the notion put about by Knight and some others that this may actually have all been done with the Machiavellian connivance of the KGB's successor agency, the SVR, seems a bit too clever or conspiratorial by half. The hand of British intelligence is evident, and Andrew clearly has a 'special relationship' with SIS. But what advantage the SVR could hope to reap from this publication remains obscure, especially as it describes a downward trajectory of Soviet intelligence from success long ago to increasing incompetence in latter days. Finally, taking the Archive at face value, there is no doubt that it is an extremely valuable addition to the literature on Soviet and Cold war espionage, albeit with questionable origins.
Much of the media feeding frenzy that accompanied the book can be set aside as silly, if not irrelevant. The British press and public has once again demonstrated that any revelation about spies or moles is guaranteed to rouse what can only be called prurient interest. Ever since Burgess and Maclean made their run to Moscow in 1951, the British have treated espionage as a branch of pornography. The outing of the 'Red Granny' (Melita Norwood) briefly displaced the tits and bums from their usual place of pride in the gutter press, followed by the bent copper turned into aging Romeo spy by female KGB trainers. Just as with sex scandals, the public mood then quickly turned from prurience to self-righteous moralizing, as cries went up from the Tory hanging and flogging crowd to lock the old lady up as an example - of what, was not entirely clear. After the British fever abated, it was the turn of other countries to go through spasms of their own, as names of those who had allegedly co-operated in the past with the KGB were bandied about.
It is doubtful that many readers enticed by the advance publicity will actually get very far into this voluminous tome of close to 1000 name and date filled pages. A gripping read it ain't. The good news is that for those who are serious about the study of espionage, this is actually a very useful compendium. I said: 'compendium'. The title is quite appropriate. It really is an 'archive', and should not be mistaken as more than an archive.
Occasionally, the authors (well, probably Andrew) aspire to make broad generalizations of wider academic significance. These tend to be lightweight assertions, of limited explanatory interest. There is a familiar, but contradictory, litany that [a] the West confronted and defeated the KGB forces of evil; but [b]: these forces are still alive and well, and ready for a rematch, if we don't exercise due vigilance. All well and good - and yes, Vladimir Putin, ex-KGB careerist, is now Yeltsin's successor. But attentive readers will still be left with the more interesting questions still unanswered: Why did the KGB fail in the Soviet era? (this of course is a subset of the bigger question of why the Soviet system failed); Even if its successors continue to exercise power and influence in post-Soviet Russia, how have the conditions in which they operate transformed the role and limits of intelligence agencies as power centres? The authors barely address the latter question, but their archive offers a lot of clues to the former question, even if they often seem not always to have noticed.
First, we might note what this archive is not. It does not tell a lot about the period between the Revolution and the Stalinist terror of the 1930s that we did not know already. It contains nothing about postwar operations in Africa, Asia and Latin America. What it does contain is a great deal of information about Soviet intelligence since the late 1930s in Britain, from World war II for much of Western Europe and North America, and within the Soviet Bloc itself in the postwar era. While the book recovers much ground traversed by other sources (Andrew supplements Mitrokhin constantly from existing secondary sources, which is useful for setting context), there is indeed much new material here, as well as the addition of greater detail and texture to elucidate stories that have, until now, remained conjectural. There is no question that Mitrokhin adds enormously to our picture of postwar Soviet intelligence operations in the areas covered by the archive.
Despite the McCarthyite spin the media have put on the book, the actual text is remarkably restrained and reasonable in its handling of Westerners targeted by the KGB as agents or sources. The individuals outed by Mitrokhin appear to be what he says they were, but great care is generally taken to identify those who were unwitting dupes or, in many instances, uncooperative targets. There is always the danger of inflation in the spy trade, casual contacts becoming 'sources', and unwitting sources becoming 'assets'. Just because X appears in the KGB files as a cooperator does not necessarily mean that X was actively or consciously cooperating. Everyone knows how ludicrously overestimated socialist production quotas were, perhaps so too with socialist espionage quotas. Even in Western intelligence this phenomenon has not been unknown.
Some Western KGB targets are bizarre. If Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski were down at various times in the KGB files as targets, as Mitrokhin's notes indicate, it is hardly surprising that luckless leftist politicians and journalists should find themselves fingered unjustly as traitors. There is mercifully little of this in the Archive, even if certain unreconstructed Cold Warriors have tried to misuse it for neo-McCarthyite purposes.
There is also a sense of reasonable proportion placed on estimates of damages attributed to actual espionage agents. Some did a great deal of damage, but these we already knew about, for the most part. Others we did not know about until now were not in the same class. Despite hysterical British cries about the 'spy of the century', the now-celebrated Ms. Norwood was never remotely in a position to pass nuclear secrets comparable to those passed by Klaus Fuchs or Ted Hall. She was not a scientist, did not work at a secret nuclear facility, and in any event lost her positive vetting status in the early 1950s due to the egregious sin of being married to an open Communist party member (from whom, ironically, she kept her spying career secret, fearing disapproval!). She may have been the longest serving female agent in Britain, and may have been honoured by Moscow Centre for her dogged fidelity, but that does not make her into the mother of the Russian Bomb. Nor does the Archive suggest as much.
The Red Granny's paleolithic persistence, from Stalinism through Brezhnevism past glasnost, actually describes an exception that proves the rule - the rule being that ideological spies became an extinct species in the early Cold War era, to be replaced by those recruited by greed or blackmail. This trend, already widely documented, is given further proof in these pages. It is also clear that the myth of the 'Magnificent Five' - the fabled Cambridge ring - continued to haunt, and taunt, the KGB for decades. After the Five, the human resources available to the KGB tended to the sorry and the unreliable. With regard to operations against the 'Main Adversary' (the US), the contrast between the era of the 1930s and the war, on the one hand, and the Cold War era, is shocking. The Soviets had penetrated the US government with considerable success in the late 1930s and early 1940s - more than most observers had credited until recently. Detail arising out of the Venona decrypts and from selective access to the actual KGB archives [see the recent books by Haynes & Klehr (Venona) and Weinstein & Vassiliev (The Haunted Wood) have filled in this picture admirably] have shown how this huge espionage success was blown away by defectors (Gouzenko and Bentley) and by the codebreakers. It is ironic, as Mitrokhin again confirms, that just when America went on a Red Scare mania in the McCarthy era, the whole Soviet espionage operation in America, once so impressive, now lay in ruins.
The archive makes it clear that that Moscow kept trying to recapture the glories of the past by recreating the methods and structures that had once worked so well. Attempts were made to recreate the golden age of the great illegals, but they all more or less failed. Above all, recruitment proved a chancy business indeed in the post-ideological era. Political intelligence on the West was a bit of a black hole for Moscow. At no time did this become more obvious, and more dangerous, than during the war hysteria surrounding 'Operation Ryan' when the Kremlin convinced itself in the early 1980s that the West was planning a pre-emptive nuclear strike. We already knew much about this brittle period from Oleg Gordievsky; Mitrokhin confirms Gordievsky's scary picture. Neither source offers any credit to the intelligence of Soviet political intelligence. Mitrokhin does make clear that Soviet espionage did much better with science and technology, mainly because so much of this was located outside the now relatively vigilant and security-conscious public sector.
Copyright © MMI Intelligence Forum
Intelligence and Security Committee - The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report
PROSECUTION OF SPIES
26. As mentioned earlier, the first concern was that KGB spies had not been prosecuted for their crimes. The authorities had known about the spies for a considerable time, but had chosen not to prosecute them. It also appeared that the decision not to prosecute had been taken without reference to the prosecuting authorities. The Mitrokhin Archive listed a number of UK spies only by their KGB code-names, except when there had been a successful prosecution or it was public knowledge in which case the book identified them by name. However, the book confirmed for the first time that Mrs Melita Norwood, code-named HOLA, and John Symonds, code-named SCOT, were KGB spies. Neither of these two met these criteria.
27. The Committee decided to examine the formal procedures of both the SIS and the Security Service for handling information and what actually happened in the cases of Mrs Norwood and Mr Symonds. The evidence given to the Committee and its conclusions are detailed below, with the detailed information contained in Annexes F, G and H.
Mrs Melita Norwood - HOLA
28. The Security Service's evidence states that Mrs Norwood, HOLA, was an important UK case identified by Mr Mitrokhin's material. During 1992 and the first months of 1993 there was a clear understanding that Mr Mitrokhin's material needed to be subject to restrictive handling procedures to protect Mr Mitrokhin's security and the international handling of leads to still active spies. The Security Service felt unable to interview Mrs Norwood at this time because of these sensitivities. Later in 1993, when the sensitivities were less, the Service reviewed Mrs Norwood's case internally. They came to the conclusion that police action was inappropriate, given the age of Mrs Norwood and the passage of time since her espionage activities. However they did not consult the Law Officers on whether further action was appropriate with a view to prosecuting Mrs Norwood.
29. The Security Service denied that any decision was taken then not to prosecute Mrs Norwood. However, the Committee believes that a member of staff, to all intents and purposes, took the decision. By deciding not to interview Mrs Norwood at this time and making no attempt to gain evidence that would support a prosecution effectively prevented her possible prosecution. The then Director General of the Security Service, Dame Stella Rimington, cannot remember ever being briefed about Mrs Norwood. This supports the view that the decision was not taken at senior level.
30. The Security Service told the Committee that Mrs Norwood's case ''slipped out of sight'' until her name appeared in the draft book being written by Professor Andrew. In March 1999 the Security Service asked the Law Officers whether action could be taken with a view to prosecuting Mrs Norwood under the Official Secrets Act.
31. The Attorney General, Rt. Hon. John Morris, as he then was, responded by stating that there was no decision for him to make. In his evidence Sir John Morris explained that this meant that as a court would judge any prosecution an abuse of process, it was not necessary for him to give a view on whether further action against Mrs Norwood was appropriate. The Committee was told that a court would regard the prosecution as an abuse of process because the authorities had known about Mrs Norwood's espionage actives for a considerable time and had not taken action earlier. Consequently, he did not consider the evidential and public interest issues. On the basis of this answer from Sir John Morris, the Security Service then decided to take no further action against Mrs Norwood.
32. The Home Secretary, Jack Straw, during evidence to the Committee, questioned the Security Service decision. The interdepartmental working group agreed in July 1999 that the Home Secretary should be consulted by the Service on whether Mrs Norwood should be interviewed before the journalist David Rose approached her. This course of action, which had been agreed by the Security Service representative on the group, was subsequently overturned during a conversation with an official in the Home Office, who had not attended the meeting. The Home Secretary stated during his evidence that he wished he had been consulted. The Director General of the Security Service, Mr Stephen Lander, stated that the decision to interview Mrs Norwood was an operational matter, and therefore it was for him to make and not the Home Secretary. Mr Lander stated that he believed that the Service would gain nothing from such an interview. The Committee recognises that any admissions made by Mrs Norwood in interview would not have been admissible in evidence against her unless they had been made under caution.
33. In the Committee's opinion the submission sent by the Security Service to the Legal Secretariat for the Law Officers was written to gain endorsement for the Service's earlier 'decision' not to take any action against Mrs Norwood. Witnesses have stated that decisions on prosecutions are based on evidential grounds and that public interest considerations are only taken into account if there is sufficient evidence to support a prosecution. The Security Service's submission stated that in 1992/93 public interest reasons - the age of Mrs Norwood and the fact that the offences were committed 50 years ago - were reasons why it was considered that police action was inappropriate. The submission also stated that there was a lack of evidence.
34. The Committee believes that it was a serious failure of the Security Service not to refer Mrs Norwood's case to the Law Officers in mid 1993. This failure to consult the Law Officers resulted in the decision whether or not to prosecute Mrs Norwood effectively being taken by the Security Service. The Committee is concerned that the Service used public interest reasons to justify taking no further action against Mrs Norwood, when this was for the Law Officers to decide. We also believe that the failure of the Security Service to interview Mrs Norwood at this time prevented her possible prosecution.
35. The Committee is concerned that Mrs Norwood's case ''slipped out of sight'' between 1993 and 1998. The Committee believes that Mrs Norwood's case should have been kept under review during this period. This was a further serious failure by the Security Service.
36. We are concerned that it took over three months to consult the Law Officers after the Home Secretary was told in 1998 that the Law Officers were being consulted. The Committee also questions the basis on which the Security Service took the decision not to interview Mrs Norwood prior to her name being made public by the BBC. We believe that the Service could have interviewed Mrs Norwood, at least for the intelligence and historical record.
Mr John Symonds - SCOT
37. The Committee discovered that the Security Service only contacted the Law Officers on 9 September 1999 to see if Mr Symonds, SCOT, could be prosecuted. This was despite the fact that they had known for a considerable time that Mr Symonds would be included and named in The Mitrokhin Archive. Mr Symonds was mentioned in the 10 March 1999 letter to the Law Officers on Mrs Norwood, but no opinion on whether Mr Symonds should be prosecuted was sought. In their evidence, the Security Service stated that they had followed up the allegations made by Mr Symonds in 1985. At that time, the Service had recorded that the Director of Public Prosecutions had given Mr Symonds immunity from prosecution for all crimes but serious offences of violence prior to his disclosure of his alleged KGB exploits. This immunity had been given in the context of police corruption enquiries.
38. When the Security Service received the information on Mr Symonds from Mr Mitrokhin's material they investigated the case. They interviewed people with whom Mr Symonds had made contact and concluded that no information had been compromised. However, the Security Service never interviewed Mr Symonds. On 20 December 1999 the Solicitor General announced that no action would be brought against Mr Symonds, on the grounds that he had previous immunity from prosecution.
39. The Committee believes that it was a serious failure of the Security Service not to refer Mr Symonds' case to the Law Officers in mid 1993. We are concerned that it took over 9 months to consult the Law Officers after he was identified in the draft book. We believe that the Service could have interviewed Mr Symonds, at least for the intelligence and historical record.
Recent Changes to the arrangements
40. The Committee was told in evidence that steps have now been taken to ensure that these mistakes do not occur again. Whilst criteria exist for prosecutions, the Security Service has agreed to send all material relevant to prosecutions to the Legal Secretariat to the Law Officers on a trial basis for 12 months. This will allow the Law Officers to assess when a prosecution is possible for all cases and validate these criteria for future use. The correspondence is also copied to the Legal Advisor at the Home Office for information.
41. To prevent any cases and leads not being followed up, the Director General has employed a retired member of staff to check every historical case to ensure that they have all been correctly investigated. Additionally, the Home Secretary has agreed with the Director General that all current cases will be reviewed annually and their status reported to him.
Rudolf Ivanovich Abel
Was a very happy spy,
And wherever spies would gather
They would say, "What a guy!"
Then one dark and stormy night
Came the FBI:
"Rudolf, in our very sight
You did dare to spy tonight!"
Now Rudolf's days are over,
But all other spies agree
Rudolf Ivanovich Abel
Will go down in history.
J.B. Donovan family
Real name - WILLIAM AUGUST FISHER
Born July 11, 1903 Newcastle upon Tyne, Northumberland, England -- died Nov. 15, 1971, Moscow.
Father - Genrich Matveyevich Fisher (b. in 1871 in Russia, d. in 1935, Moscow) was a revolutionary who had been an associate of Lenin. Both parents were Germans. In 1889 Genrich Fisher was arrested and sentenced for 3 years of exile. In 1901 he emigrated to Britain, where spent 20 years organizing and indoctrinating factory workers. He was a secretary of the Newcastle "communist cell". Genrich Fisher actively participated in the arms smuggling to Russia. At the age of 16 William Fisher passed the entry test to the London University and received British citizenship. Soon after in 1921 Fisher's family returned to Russia and initially resided in Kremlin (!). After Lenin's death Genrich Fisher ran out of favor and lived in the Vologda region. Mother - Lubov Vasilyevna was a midwife. William's older brother Genrich was born in Russia and tragically died (drown) upon return to Russia.
William Fisher was drafted to Red Army in 1925 where he served in "radio battalion". His wife, Elena Stepanovna Lebedeva, was a cellist in the children's theater orchestra. His daughter Evelyn was born in 1929. By recommendation of his wife's sister he joined security agency OGPU in 1927, and later on its foreign department.
The first Fisher's assignment was in Norway from 1931 to 1934 with his wife and daughter, under the code name FRANK. He received new real English passport and was traveling under his own name. During his first foreign assignment Fisher also was probably in other European countries organizing the web of clandestine radio stations and sometimes posing as an artist.
In 1935/36 he was sent to Britain. He was probably mainly utilized there as a radioman and cypherer, apparently transmitting information from the Philby group.
The long time Fisher's friend - Kirill Khenkin concluded on the basis of his conversations with Fisher, that in Britain Fisher became acquainted with the world's most renown Russian physicist Pyotr Kapitsa (1978 Nobel Prize winner). Khenkin believe, that Fisher, apparently, played important role to convince hesitated Kapitsa to return to the Soviet Union, where his passport was seized and he was detained (although he received exceptional treatment and special institute was build for him) .
Kapitsa confirmed this story in the memoirs of Andrei Saharov and even recollected Fisher's real name.
In 1938 Fisher was sent to Chernovtsy, near the boarder between Bukovina, Galicia, and Polish territory occupied by the Germans to finalize contacts with agents recruited from German, Polish, and Ukrainian ethnic minorities.
On December 31, 1938 he was expelled from intelligence and only by chance avoided further repressions, because his brother in law was declared enemy of the people and his boss in Britain Alexander Orlov defected to the West in 1938. Fisher worked as a patent technician in the "All Union Trade Palate" and later at the airplans manufacturing plant as an engineer.
He was recalled by NKVD in September of 1941 and became a chief of the radio communication section "Otdelnaya Brigada NKVD" in the Sudoplatov's 4th "Special Tasks" Directorate. In the mid1942 Fisher was put in charge of the "deception games" radio control. He took part in the famous radio-deception operation "Monastery".
During the war he lived in his Moscow apartment together with his friends - real Rudolf Abel and future dissident Kirill Khenkin.
Real Rudolf Abel was a Fisher's co-worker. He was born in Riga, Latvia on September 23, 1900 /not on July 2, 1902 as Fisher stated to the FBI/. He went on several assignments to China and some European countries.
His brother was executed by NKVD in 1938. Rudolf Abel died in 1955. In 1946 Fisher was transferred to the NKVD "Committee of Information" under supervision of Alexander Korotkov, but he still remained in Sudoplatov's disposal. Since 1946 Sudoplatov headed "Special Service for Intelligence and Sabotage with MGB" /a.k.a. "Bureau MGB N1 for Foreign Sabotage" since 1950/. Fisher entered special training program for his future assignment in the US.
On October 12, 1948 Fisher left to the United States under the code name ARACH. His salary was $500 per month ($3,570 in 2000) and he got $5,000 ($35,700 in 2000) for establishing his cover-up. He entered US from Canada on November 16, 1948 as Andrew Kayotis (real American who died in Russia).
Fisher's general assignment was reorganization of the whole "illegal" (without diplomatic or other "cover") spy network in the US and setting up his own system of radio communications with Moscow.
In accordance to the Sudoplatov's memoirs, Fisher was also in charge of creating the sabotage network. Actually it was two separate networks: on the West and East coasts.
West coast network encompassed agents in California, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. Latin American agents were experts in sabotage operations with experience in guerilla war against Germany. One of them was Maria de la Sierra, (code name PATRIA) was Trotsky's former secretary (a.k.a "Africa"). Michael and Anna Filonenko were Fisher's contacts in Brazil. Michael Filonenko was an extremely successful Soviet agent in South America. He was sent there in 1951 through China as an immigrant. With experience only in mathematics and blasting bridges and railroads he started from the scratch successful business in Brazil and became acquainted with the members of the Brazilian government and even Paraguayan dictator Stressner. After Abel's arrest, contacts with Filonenko were kept only via radio station located on the special "fishing" vessel in the Antarctic. The remains of the South American spy network, created by Filonenko, are probably active even today.
Initially major targets for Fisher were on the West Coast near Long Beach military facilities. Agent there had a connections in the Chinese community which could allow to put explosives on board of American ships carrying supplies to the Far East.
East coast network included in part Kurt Wissel who had an experience in sabotage operations in prewar Europe was a senior engineer in the shipbuilding company near Norfolk.
He set up an infrastructure which includes dockers and service personnel from German ethnic community for performing sabotage operations.
In the autumn of 1950 during the pick of the Korean war all "explosive experts" were summoned from Latin America and stayed in the US for two months ready to act. Fisher established the permanent radio communications with special combat troops which were stationed in Latin America and were ready to come North through Mexico, disguised as seasonal workers. There was a network of safe apartments and supporting infrastructure established especially for these purposes.
These activities were never discovered and incriminated to Fisher. However there are some later circumstantial collaborations (e.g. on Fisher's trial, Hayhanen, who turned Fisher to FBI, recollects conversation with him regarding blowing up the Washington bridge).
Recent discovery of the "Mitrokhin files" is confirming Sudoplatov's account. Mitrokhin’s material shows how the KGB stashed weapons, radios and money in secret hiding places in the United States. The Port of New York was allegedly described a major target, with KGB files showing weak points in security.
Some of the Fisher's agents - Maria de la Sierra, Grinchenko, Filonenko recently were officially recognized in Russia as an important Intelligence officers and were awarded by orders and medals, but Russians still refuse to disclose their activities in the 1948-1955 period.In 1950 Fisher settled in Brooklyn studio apartment in the cover life under the name of Emil R. Goldfus - photographer and artist. He had several radio transmission sites: between New York and Norfolk, near the Great Lakes and on the West Coast.
Fisher befriended young artist Burt Silverman, who painted his portrait... with the spy's short wave radio...
Fisher's art photos made in New York
In addition to the "special tasks" activities Fisher assumed command of the atomic spy network's remains. He was trying to continue recruitment of the American physicists working on atomic projects. He supervised activities of the well known spies Lona and Morris Cohens (codenames VOLONTEER & LESLY) with whom he become close friend. Cohens were dedicated Stalinists and recruited many informers. They worked as couriers between atomic scientists, including Theodore Hall, and Soviet controllers. When Rosenbergs were discovered in 1950 the Cohens fled to Paris. Cohens were later arrested in Britain on another assignment as Peter and Helen Kroger, sent to prison for 20 years and later exchanged.
T. Hall -
In 1948-1949 Fisher led the approaches to top level American nuclear scientists to resume cooperation "with the international anti-fascist scientific community", which they turned down. By that time the Cold War was on and the Americans knew that Soviets already had nuclear weapons. He personally met Theodore Hall in a New York in 1949 to assuage Hall's doubts about remaining in espionage. Theodore Alvin Hall (code names PERSEUS, MLAD) was one of the most important sources of information from Los Alamos laboratories. He begin to supply information for the Soviet intelligence when his was just a 19 years old because he "was worried about the dangers of an American monopoly of atomic weapons". After the Soviets successfully tested their own nuclear bomb, Hall decided he had done enough to balance the world and withdrew from spying. Aparently in 1952 Fisher himself unsuccessfully tried last to convince MLAD to continue spying. At those period his code name was changed to MARK. Fisher was recalled to Moscow in 1955 for several months mostly for "reliability checking".
At those time he already asked for recall of his assistant Hayhanen who later betrayed him. Hayhanen was assigned to Fisher in 1954 to substitute another assistant - Robert who was initially sent to Fisher but died on the way to the US when his ship sank in the Baltic sea. (Correct Russian name - Gyavgyanen Andrei Stepanovich, born. 1920).
Hayhanen's defection was known to Moscow. The Center ordered Fisher to leave New York. He fled to Florida where he waited for two months. Soviet spies watched the studio and reported no presence of FBI surveillance. Fisher felt it safe to return to New York, where he was arrested in the Manhattan's Latham Hotel.
The story of Fisher's capture by FBI is described in details on the FBI web site "Famous Cases":
these photos are from http://www.fbi.gov/fbinbrief/historic/famcases/abel/abel.htm
Pavel Sudoplatov in his book "Special Tasks" wrote the following about Rosenberg's case: "The FBI appeared to be acting just like the NKVD, following political orders rather than handling the case professionally, which would required continued surveillance of the Rosenbergs to determine the identity of their controller and the extent of their role in Soviet intelligence operations in America. The FBI's hastle prevented it from detecting our illegal William Fisher.. who was not arrested until 1957". The code name of Hellen Sobell, the wife of Morton Sobell, a member of the Rosenberg's group, was found in Fisher's wallet. It was discovered that Fisher transferred the money for Hellen Sobell, but he was never connected to the Rosenberg's case, and sabotage conspiracies were never discovered.
Shots taken after arrest .
Studio on Fulton street
Click on the left and right thumbnails to view QuickTime Video Clips of Abel's arest.
Requires the QuickTime browser plug-in
The very detailed account of this period of Fisher's life and story of his exchange on Francis Gary Powers is given by his attorney James B. Donovan in his book "Strangers on a Bridge". Donovan was a prominent lawyer with exceptional reputation, Nuremberg trial and OSS background. He took this case as a pro-bono upon request of the bar association.Some Donovan's reminiscences are worth to be noted :
-- It was evident, just as Judge Abruzzo had told me, that Abel was a cultured man with an exceptional background... He knew five other languages (except English), was an electronics engineer, knew chemistry and nuclear physics, was an accomplished amateur musician and painter, mathematician and cryptographer.
-- At any rate , Rudolf was an intellectual and a gentleman, with a fine sense of humor... As a man, you could not help but like him.
-- I said I'd do my best for him and see that he received due process of law each step of the way... He said quietly, "I want you to do nothing that will lower the dignity of someone honorably servinga great nation".
-- The first of his three-counts indictment was "conspiracy to transmit atomic and military information to Soviet Russia (maximum penalty, death)"... In Texas "FBI offered him freedom and $10,000-a-year job in United States counterintelligence if he would "cooperate". /$61,000 in 2000/
-- During interrogation "agent cuffed him across the face... He had never mentioned this Texas incident... His self -respect, I suppose, would not permit him to whine over a single slap in a face.
-- Fisher's cellmate Vincent J. Squillante "was reputed to be the extortion "king" of the multimillion-dollar garbage haulting rackets in metropolitan New York... "How are you getting along?" "Quite well,.. I am teaching him French"... "Rudolf," I said with genuine astonishment, "what in a heaven's name would a gorilla like Squillante do with a knowledge of French?" "Frankly, I don't know, Mr. Donovan, but what else could I do with the fellow?.."
-- "I wish," Dulles [CIA Director] said, puffing at his inevitable pipe, "we had three or four just like him inside Moscow, right now."
On November 15, 1957 Fisher was sentenced for 30 years' imprisonment. He appealed his convictions all the way to the Supreme court, claiming that rights guaranteed to him under the Constitution and laws of the United States had been violated. In 1960 by only a five-to-four decision the Supreme Court upheld Fisher's conviction.
Court materials related to the Fisher's appeal (ABEL, ALIAS MARK, ALIAS COLLINS, ALIAS GOLDFUS V. UNITED STATES) available at : http://www.ol2.net/cases/usnyabcs.htm
In the summer of 1961 NBC and Justice Department with participation of Attorney General Robert Kennedy arranged creation of the special edition of "David Brinkley’s Journal" show about Abel's case. The show included interview with Hayhanen (Gyavgyanen) and footage of Abel in Atlanta prison painting portrait of President Kennedy. "Would they like to kill you?" Brinkley asked. "Yes" was the Hayhanen's answer. The tag line at the end of the program said that "We are authorized to say... that if any others like Eugene Maki care to step forward any time they will be guaranteed security, physical and financial." By the time program was aired - 8 Nov. 1961, Hyhanen was already dead. Few month before this date David Brinkley was notified by the CIA, but no changes were made in the program. Apparently he was killed in a mysterious ‘accident’ on the New Jersey or the Pennsylvania Turnpike. CIA officials claimed later that he died from natural causes but did not substantiated it by any facts.
In 1962 James B. Donovan become the chief negotiator in exchange of about $ 60 million worth of baby food, drugs, medical supplies for release of 1,113 CIA-trained Cuban exiles captured in Cuba. He died of cancer in 1970.
Fisher was doing time in Atlanta penitentiary together with other famous prisoners, like Joe Valachi and Vito Genovese. Morton Sobell also was there. They became friends and were often playing chess. Fisher was, according to Morton Sobell who saw him nearly every day, "thin and ailing". Morton Sobell is alive today and still denying any espionage participation.
The former FBI agent Larry McWilliams, recalled a visit he made to the "Colonel Abel" in an Atlanta prison: "I remember once Abel asked for some paper and a pencil. He started writing out some Einsteinian equations -- just for fun". "He was an artist, a master mechanic, and radio technician," said McWilliams, describing a few of Colonel Abel's many talents. "He was a magnificent enemy -- a pro.
In prison Fisher painted
portrait of JFK
Fisher returned to Russia In 1962, after serving five years of his sentence, in exchange on U-2 pilot Gary Powers. The exchange was orchestrated mainly by J. Donovan.
It is interesting that Powers was serving his term in Vladimir prison sharing the cellblock with Fisher's boss Sudoplatov. Sudoplatov was arrested in 1953 as Beria's associate and released only in 1968. He was incarcerated by his own government for 3 times longer period than Fisher in Atlanta prison, which is probably no match to Vladimir prison by it's accommodation standards...
In 1964 Fisher actively campaigned before Breznev for Sudoplatov's earlier release.
Pardon isued by
Fisher lived in Moscow in a small (290 sq.ft) two-room apartment with his family. No compensation was made for $10,000 of his own money which he spent on his defense.
In accordance to his daughter Evelin, Fisher had 3 questions about Soviet economy:
1. Why "over-fulfill" production plans?
2. Why workers are getting premiums for fulfillment the plans?
3. How it is possible to produce something from "saved materials"?
There are also some notable recollections about last period of the Fisher's life made by Kirill Khenkin:
-- Fisher's wife explained that Fisher did not receive the "Hero of The Soviet Union" rank because it was not suitable for central newspapers to publish official decree with his jewish-like name...
-- When his wife was in a hospital, Fisher asked for permission to buy a caviar in a special KGB store. He was advised by his superior to write a letter to KGB chief Yuri Andropov, but do not ask more than 200Gr...
-- Legendary spy had a small suburb house (inherited from his mother) where he was chasing rats with a rifle for hours, but never killed any...
-- There was no sewage in this house. Technically advanced Fisher built special counterbalances and ventilation devices which allowed the toilet to function flawlessly...
-- Once walking in the forest Fisher said to Kirill Khenkin "If everything has to be realized and admitted the only way out is to take the rope and hang oneself.."
In accordance to his daughter, Fisher was pity that he became a spy and said that his happiest years where when he was fired from OGPU and worked at the plant as a radio engineer.
KGB denied Fisher in a meeting with James B. Donovan, as well as in a meeting with his American friend artist Burt Silverman when they were visiting Moscow. In 1968 Fisher made an appearance in the popular Soviet spy-movie "Dead Season".
In GDR Fisher was extensively traveling around Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with lectures mainly before intelligence audience. He became an "exhibit" by his own expression. Fisher also became a notorious billiard player. His last code name he got in the Moscow billiard circles - SHARK
William Fisher died on November 15, 1971 from lung cancer. In accordance to his daughter some of his last words were in English: "Don't forget that we are Germans anyway"...
In 1990 Fisher was honored with his portrait on the postage stamp. Other stamps in this series were dedicated to Konon Molodyi, captured in England in 1961, who was also a close Fisher's friend, and Kim Philby, the British double agent who fed key secrets to the Soviet Union for 26 years, whom Fisher called traitor.....
for sale $70
In 1999 Russian Government in cooperation with SVR (former KGB) published in English and Russian limited edition (1,200) nicely printed Art Album. It includes some Fisher's Memoirs and about 70 of his Paintings, Drawings and Prints. Almost all run was taken by SVR. We got 6 copies which we can sell for $70 each. Please e-mail for details.
Please send your comments to:email@example.com
When Norman Mailer began his novel "Barbary Shore",
there was no plan to have a Russian spy as a character.
As he worked on it, he introduced a Russian spy in the
U.S. as a minor character. As the work progressed, the
spy became the dominant character in the novel. After
the novel was completed, the U.S. Immigration Service
arrested a man who lived just one floor above Mailer in
the same apartment building. He was Rudolf Abel.
© 1998-2001 Alex Heft
Informace o KGB na Internetu
(analyza 17. listopadu, z teto adresy ale nefunguje odbocka, je tam omylem jeste stara linka)